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Summary  findings
Cotton exports account for a significant  share of  Varangis,  Thigpcn, and Satyanarayan  examine the
commodity  exports for some developing  countries,  feasibility  of using New York  cotton futures and options
especially  in West Africa  and Central Asia. In these  contracts  as hedging instruments.  Thcy base their
countries, dependency  on cotton for export revenues has  analysis  on a portfolio selection  problem in which the
increased  in the past 20 years. Thes  countries therefore  hedger selects  the optimal  proporrions of unhedged and
have a high exposure  to cotton price volatility.  hedged output to minimize  risk.
Cotton-producing developing  countries and economies  The results  suggest  that despite the existence  of
in transition make little use of hedging mechanisms  to  relatively  high basis risk (that is, a rclatively  low
reduce their risk from the volatility  of cotton export  correlation between  spot and future prices),  hedging
revenues.  Countrics in Francophone Wcst Africa use  reduces  cotton price volatility  by 30 to 70 percenL
forward sales to hedge but only for a small  share of the  Moreover, for all varicties of cotton examined,  the
crop.  hedge ratio (the percentage  of cxports hedged) was
These countries could use  cotton futures  and options  below one. Using a hedge ratio of one (naive  hedge),  at
contracts to hedge against short- to medium-term  price  times,  increases  rather than decreases isk.
volatility,  making cotton export revenues  more  The results also show that hedgin;. while reducing
predictable. Cotton futures and options contracts could  risk, also reduces  expected returns. Attitudes toward risk
aiso make cotton-related commnercial  transactions.  more  - that is, the degree of risk aversion  - determnine  how
flexible. (Futures  could be sold when there are no buyers  much of Nis risk-return tradeoff is acceptable.  For a risk-
in bhe  physical  market, for example.)  In West Africa,  averse  agent, the main benefit  of hedging lies in risk
futures and options oould complement the exisdng  reduction rather than in the potential for increased
system  of forward sales.  returns.
This  paper-aproduct  ofthe International  Trade  Division,  International Economics  Department-is  partof a larger  effort
in the department to examine  the benefits  of using  market-based  risk management  instruments  in developing  countries and
economies  in transition. Copies  of the paper are available  free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street  NW, Washington,  DC
20433. Please  coatact Dawn Gustafson,  room R2-092, extension 33714 (28 pages).  July 1994.
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New York Cotton  futures/options  contracts provide an effective way
to  reduce  cotton  price  volatility,  despite  the  existence  of
relatively  high basis risk.Cotton is an important crop for many developing countries.
Table 1.  shows  the share  of cotton  in  total agricultural  exports for
major cotton  producing countries.  The countries with the highest
reliance are in Francophone  Africa  (FPA).- In Benin and Burkino
Faso,  for  example,  cotton  accounts  for  about  two-thirds  of
agricultural  export  revenues. 1-Other countries  in which cotton  has
a  high  share  in  total  agricultural  export:s  include  the  countries  in
the  Former Soviet Union  (FSU)  and Pakistan.  Table 1 also shows
that  the sbare  of cotton in total  agriculture  exports  has increased
for  many  countries/regions over  the  last  twenty years.  The
significant share of cotton in agricultural (and total) exports
suggests a high  exposure to cotton  price volatility.  Presently,
cotton  producing  developing  countries  make  very limited  use of risk
managemen~t  instruments.  to hedge this exposure.  The main reasons
for  this  are the  goverament  intervention  that  reduces  the incentive
to hedge  (by  setting minimum or fixed prices and thus absorb the
price  risk) and  the  lack of  technical know-how  in using risk
management instruments.  2  Another reason could be the  cost  of
hedging which is defined in this context as the risk-return  trade
off.
'We  would  like  to  thank  Ronald  Duncan  for  valuable  comments.
'See  also  Satyanarayan,  et.  al.,  1993.
2For a detailed discussion on the impediments to the use of
risBk  management  instruments  in developing countries  see Claessens
anmd  Varangis (1994).2
Table 1:  Cotton's Share in Total  Agricultural Export Revenues in
Selected Countries
1971  1981  1991
---------  .- (U---
Francophone  Africa  7.3  9.7  23.5
rso  24.2  49.7  46.4
Pakistan  34.2  41.7  40.7
Turkey  181  26.9  11.5
-China  2.0  1.1  0.7
World  5.1  _  3.1  2.5
Source:  IECIT  estimates  using  data  obtained  from  FAO
International  Trade Tapes.
The recent marketing liberalization effortL in many cotton
producing  developing  countries  are  likely  to  expose  participants  to
market forces and make hedging instruments such as futures and
options attractive  in reducing intertemporal  price volatility.
However, even without liberalization, there is scope for using
hedging  instruments.  In  most  cases  where  government  intervention
is  prevalent,  the  government  effectively  internalizes (assumes)  the
cotton  price  risk.  For  example,  governments  in  China  and
Uzbekistan and cotton  parastatals  in Turkey and the FPA countries
could  make good  use of hedging  instruments  in reducing  cotton  price
volatility.  FPA countries  use forward  sales for this  purpose,  but
this instrument only provides limited coverage (see  Satyanaryan,
et.  aL9.,  193).
The  usual  arguments  for  hedging  are  that  by  doing  so  market
participants  can  increase  the  predictability  of  future  cash  flows,
lock-in  profit  margins,  and  reduce  the  price  uncertainty  of3
investment  projects.  Where available,  futures  and options  provide
the most efficient  way for dealing with-short-term (mainly  intra-
year)  price  uncertainty.  In  addition,  futures  and  options
contracts can add to the flexibility of selling decisions, for
example,  by  giving  flexibility to  buyers  to  "call-in" their
purchasing  price. 
The present paper examines the  feasibility of using N.Y.
cotton futures contracts  to hedge cotton  price risk in developing
countries. The  paper  concentrates  on five  countries/regions. They
are:  Uzbekistan, Pakistan, China, Turkey and  the  FPA.  These
countries/regions  were  chosen  because  they  account  for  about 60%  of
cotton  production  and  40%  of  cotton  exports  from  developing
countries,  and,  with  the  exception  of China,  cotton  exports  account
for  a  significant  part  of  agricultural  export  revenues  in  each  of
these countries/regions.'  The paper is structured as follows:
Section I of the paper quantifies  the basis risk; i.e., one minus
the  correlation  coefficient between  spot  cotton  prices  from
3For  commodity related hedging applications in  developing
countries see  Gemmill  (1985), Quattara  et.  al.  (1992), Rolfo
(1980)  , Varangis  et.  al. (1993),  Claessens  and  Varangis (1993),  and
Larson (1993).
4In 31991.  cotton exports accounted for  about 24%  of  total
agricultural  exports for FPA, 46%k  for the Central  Asian Republics
of FSU, 41% for Pakistan,  12% for Turkey,  but only 0.7%-  for China.
Overall, for the World, cotton exports account for about 2.5%k  of
total agricultural  export revenues.4
developing countries and N.Y.  cotton futures contract prices. 5
Section  II  performs  simulations  to show  to  what extent  cotton  price
volatility  is reduced by using  N.Y. cotton futures  contracts.  The
analysis is based on a portfolio selection framework in which
hedgers select the  optimal proportions of unhedged  and hedged
output.  Section III summarizes  and concludes.
'in  general,  basis risk measures  how closely futures  and spot
prices move together.  A high (low)  basis risk meanis  a low (high)
correlation between the  spot and  futures.  Basis  risk  is  the
unhedgeable part  of  the  spot  price  risk  when  using  futures
contracts  to hedge.I.  MMGXNG  THROUGH NM  YORK  COTTON  FUTURES
Cotton  prices  have  fluctuated  signif  icantly,  especially  in  the
latter  half  of the  19809.  Table 2 shows  the  average  monthly export
price, its standard  deviation and its coefficient  for  variation  of
each of t-he  cottons examined.  The coef  ficient of variation,  our
measure of volatility, is shown to vary between 17.2's  and 21.2't,
although the 17.2* for Punjab SG 1505 is for a much shorter time
period.  Thus, for the cotton prices examined, over the period
1985-92/93, the coefficient of variation is around 20% compared
with 17%-  which is the volatility of the World Bank's commodity
price  index  over  the  same  period.
The only  market  that trades in cotton  futures is the New York
Cotton  Exchange (NYCE).  The New York  No. 2  cotton  contract  is based
on  grade  41,  staple  34  (strict  low  middling  1-1/16  inch)  cotton.
The quality of the cottons from the countries covered here is
similar (middling  1-3/32 inch) but not identical.  Provided that
the characteristics  of the cash commodity are identical to the
quality  specified  in  the  futures  contract,  the  traditional
recommendation  is to  hedge all of the  cash commodity  in the  futures
market. (This  type  of a hedge is termed  a "direct  hedgel").  However,
in cases  where the cash and futures  prices are for related  but not
idenitcal  commodities,  the  appropriateness  of the futures  contractTable 2:  Cotton Price Volatility
Cotton Type  Period  Average Monthly  Standard  Coefficient of
l_______________  ,Export  Price  Deviation  Variation  a/
I  ..  -US¢---  ----  ---------
Central Asian  Aug 85 - Jan 93  66.12  14.05  21.2*
Punjab SG 1505  Aug 88 - Jun 93  69.10  11.77  17.2%
Chinese 329  May 85 - Jan 93  70.14  14.30  20.41
Turkish Izmirant  Jan 85 - Apr 92  74.99  14.59  19.51
FPA  May 85 - Jan 93  66.64  12.78  19.21
A/  Ratio of standard deviation to the mean.for  "cross-hedging"  needs to be determined.'  A  simple method,
based on price correlation,  can be used to determine how closely
the  cotton  futures  price  and  the  cotton  export  prices  move
together.  In general, the higher  the correlation  the greater the
effectiveness of a hedge. Table 3 shows the results of an OLS
(Ordinary  Least  Squares)  regression  in  which (nearby)  futures  price
changes  are regressed  on cotton  cash price changes. 7 The R-square
measures  indicate  that 30-44%  of the  variance  of cash  price changes
is explained by  futures price changes, except for the Turkish
cotton for  which the R-square  is very low (5).  The  percentage of
the variation in cash price changes which  is unexplained  (3-R
square) is  an estimate  of the  basis risk.' Thus, the basis risk is
high but this is to be expected because the underlying cash and
futures prices are for different grades of cotton, and US policy
has  to some extent insulated US markets from the world cotton
market.  A cross-hedge  in this situation  is still  feasible,  but the
optimal  quantity  to be hedged  as a  percentage  of the cash  commodity
6A  typical cross-hedge  in cotton  is to hedge the price of one
quality  by using  a futures  contract  based on a  marginally  different
quality, such as West African Cotlock  A index cotton (middling  1-
3/32 inch quality) being hedged with a New York number 2 futures
contact based on strict low middling 1-1/16 inch quality.  The
futures contract  would be liquidated  simultaneously  with the sale
of the physical cotton.
7  Note that the OLS regression  uses price changes rather than
price levels because cash and futures prices of most commodities
are  non-stationary  (Milonas  and  Vora,  1987).  A  simple
transformation such as using differenced data, as we have done,
controls for non-stationarity  of prices in levels.
'Since  options are options  on futures contracts,  the analysis
to determine  the basis risk is applicable  to the use of options on
these futures contracts.-i.e.,  the optimrfl  hedge ratio-  is less  than one and needs to be
empirically  determined. The optimal hedge ratio will depend upon
the hedger's level of risk-aversion.  Hedging is rational if the
reduction in  risk more  than  compensates for  the  reduction  in
returns.
Before  a determination  of the optimal  hedge ratio  is made, it
is of interest  to check  the relationship  between spot  cotton  prices
and the Cotlook A  index. This is because a recently introduced
cotton-futures  contract  based on the Cotlook  A index  may be a more
appropriate hedging instrument than the New York No.  2 futures
contract.'  Table 3 reports the results of regressing Cotlonk A
index price changes on spot cotton  price changes from developing
countries. 10 The R square indicates  that  with the exception  of the
Turkish cotton, 70-85%*  of  the  variation in  the  cotton prices
examined is explained by  changes in the  Cotlook A  Index. This
reasonably  good fit is not surprising  given that the spot cotton
prices examined  are part of the fourteen  components  of the Cotlook
A index.  The fact that the cotton  prices examined and the Cotlook
A  index were significantly correlated impli-es  that the Cotlook
futures contract  may prove a better hedging instrument for these
cotton than  the New York No.2 cotton  futures contract.  Moreover,
9For  the  definition  of the  Cotlook  A index  see  note  under  Table
10We use spot-to-spot regression rather than spot-to-futures
because there is not sufficient  data on Cotlook A futures  prices.
We, therefore, assume a close relationship between the Cotlook
Index and Cotlook futures contract  prices.9
Table 3:  QUANTICATON  OF BASIS RSK
Cotton Type  PidHedge  Ratio  Basis  Rs
Using N.Y. No. 2 Cotton Future  Contract  _  ___
Cecntral  Asian  Aug 85-Jan  93  .38  .30  .70
PunjjabSGlSOS5  Aug 88-1an  93  .66  .44  .56
Chinese 329  May 85-Jan  93  .42  .39  .61
Turkish  Izmirant  Jan 85-~Apr  92  .20  .05  .95
EPA  May 85-Jan  93  .34  .30  .70
____________  Using  Cotlook A Index
Cenftral  Asian  Aug 85-Jan  93  .98  .85  .15
Punjab SG 1505  Aug 88-Jan  93  1.01  .73  .27
Chinese 329  MayS85-Jan  93  .79  .68  .32
TurkishIzmirant  Jan 85-Apr  92  .39  .34  .66
EPA  1May 85-1an  93  .80  .80  .20
Note: The Cotlook  A Index  is published  daily by Cotlook  Limited,  a cotton  information  service
in the United Kingdom. The A index is an avenage  of the 5 lower  quotes  in USC/lb  for cotton
being  ofli:red  in significant  quantifies  from 14 cotton  growin regions  in 13  producing  countrie.
The Index is based on cotton comparable  to middling  1-3/32  inch quality by the 'Liverpol"
concept,  delivered  C.I.  F. North  Europe, cash against  documents  on arrival  of vessel,  includin
profit and agent's commission. T'he  Index is presented  as an indication  of fth  compe-titive  level
of offering  prices.10
the New  York Cotton  Exchange  has addeeC  additional  serial  months to
the Cotlook  World Cotton  Futures  contract-  -for  which settlement  is
based on the Cotlook  A Index-  -to increase the trading  and hedging
OPPortunities  for market  users.  In addition  to the regular cycle
months of March, May, August, October, and December, two spot or
serial  months  from  the  January,  February,  April,  September,  and
November  cycle  will  also  be  available.  The  Exchange  anticipates
that  the  addition  of  rolling  spot  months  will  increase  the
contract'Is  liquidity and af  ford hedgers and speculators a more
viable trading vehicle.  However, the present very low level of
liquidity of the contract is likely to discourage use  of this
contract  for hedging purposes.CIRISK MINIMIZM'ION  (EX-ANITE  RISK-KInI  VZ  1  HEDGEs)
we turn  now to analyzing  the  risk  management  prospects  for
cottons from selected developing countries.  We assume throughout
the paper that the objective of the hedger is simply  to minimize
risk  regardless  of the  risk-reduction  tradeoff (i.e.*,  the hedger  is
highly risk averse).
The  cotton  hedging decision can  be  thought of  as  a
por-tfolio  selection  problem  in  which  the  hedger  selects  the optimal
proportions of unhedged (spot)  and hedged (futures)  output." 1 The
portfolio can then  be represented  as:
ERp  E  . E(St+,  - St)  +  Qh  E (Ft+,  - Ft)  ........ (1)
where:
ER,  =  Expected return on the hedged  portfolio
Q,=  Unhedged output
E  (St+,  - St)  =  Expected  change  in the cotton spot  price from  time t
to time t+l
Qh  =Hedged  output
E  (F, 14 I 1 - Ft.)  =Expected  change in the futures  price from time t
to time t+l
In terms  of conventional  portfolio  theory,  hedged  output  can
be thought of as a riskless asset and unhedged output as a riskcy
asset.Note that (  + 0)=Q,the  amount  of output  available  for export.
At ti.me  period  t, the  values of S,4 1 and F,+  are unknown.  These are,
therefore,  random variables. In a hedge, Q. and Qh  have opposite
signs.  For instance,  in a short  hedge,  a long  position in the spot
market (Q.,>  0) is offset  by a short  position in the futures  market
:Q  - 0).  Rewriting  equation  1  for  a  long  cash/short  futures
position  we have:
ER,  Qu [  E  (St. 1 t 1 St)  - (Qh,  /0Qu)  E  (F 1.,.-  Ft)I......(2)
Let h=Q,).if  the value of Q.isset  equal to1,  then hcan
be interpreted  as the hedge ratio - the percentage  of the spot or
cash position  that is hedged in the futures  market. Thus,
ERp=  E  (St+ - St)  - h E  (Ft+ - Ft).(3)
If the portfolio is completely  hedged, that is, each unit in the
spot market is hedged with a unit of futures, then h =  1a  b  (This
type.of  a  hedge is called  a "naive  hedge".)  If  h = 0, then there  is
no hedging  and  the expected  return  on the  portfolio  is simply  equal
to the return on the spot market.
The variance  of the  portfegolio  is a measure of the risk  of
the  portfolio.  The  variance  of the  portfolio (Var(P))  is given  by:
Var(P) = Var(S) + h  V(Far  -1)  2 h cov  (S,F)..............  (4)13
where:
Var(S), Var(F) =  variance of spot  and futures  price changes
cov(S,F)  covariance  between spot and futures price changes
Recall that we  are assuming that the  objective of  the  cotton
producing  countries  is simply  to minimize  risk.  The  problem then  is
to identify  a  h, such  that  Var(P)  is minimized.  This can be done  by
differentiating  Var(P) with respect to h as follows:
d Var(P)/  ah  =  2 h Var(F)  - 2 cov(S,F)  =  0
Solving for h from the above results in:
h-  =  cov(S,F) /  Var(F)  ..................  (5)
It can  be shown  that  h  (the  risk-minimizing  hedge  ratio)  is simply
the slope  coefficient  of an OLS linear  regression  of futures  price
char.ges  on spot  price changes (see  Ederington,  1979). h signifies
how much of the output needs to be hedged in order to minimize
risk.  A hedge ratio  of 1 shows  that all output  needs to be hedged
to  achieve  risk  minimization. Furthermore,  for  cotton,  in  order to
hedge 50,000 lbs of cotton, one needs to purchase one N.Y. No. 2
cotton  futures/options  contracts  which has an underlying  quantity
of 50,000 lbs.4~~~~~~~~~~1
--  ~~~~~~~~~14
For the construction  of hedges  we need to determine  when the
hedge is placed and how long it will last.  We assume that the
hedges  are placed during the planting (sowing)  season in order to
guarantee profits to growers and cover the fixed minimum price
offered  to  growers  by  the  parastal marketing  agency  or  the
government.  The sowing season for FPA cotton ends around July-
August.  Thus,  we assume  that  the  hedge  for FPA  cotton  is placed  in
August  of each  year by buying  the  July  No. 2 contract  and lifted  at
the end of June before the contract expires. The timing of the
hedge,  therefore,  approximately  coincides  with  the  cotton  season  in
FPA  countries.  Hedges  for 1987  through  1991  are  constructed  in  this
manner.=  For the other cottons we assume the hedges are placed
around  the planting season, in  April of each year, by buying  next
year's  March  contract  and lifting  it the  end of February  before  the
contract  expires.13  Thus, the commitment  in the futures  market is
equal  to a  period  of 11 months  from  the time  the  hedge is placed  to
the time it is lifted.  Hedges  are constructed  for those  years for
which  data are available.
«The  estimated  ex-ante,  risk-minimizing  hedge  ratios  appear  to
be very similar for each of these periods.  This indicates the
robustness  of the estimated  hedge ratio over the various periods
(see  Tables  3 through 7).
"The results do not change significantly  if we pick another
month  for  simulations.  Compare,  for  instance,  Table  5  in
Satyanarayan  et. al. (1993)  and Table  7 in this  paper.  The timing
of the hedges  for FPA cotton  in these  tables  is different,  but the
risk-reduction  results are quite similar.The  risk-minimizing hedge  ratios  for  each  year  are
calculated  by using  information  available  at  the  time  the  hedge  was
placed.  Thus, the hedge ratio for the August  1989 hedge for FPA
cotton  was  estimated  using  data  between  May 1985  and  July  1989;  the
hedge ratio for the August 1990 hedge was estimated  using data
between  May 1985 and July 1990,  and so on. These hedges  are thus
es-ante  hedges.-
Tables 4 through 8 report  the estimated  risk-minimizing
hedge  ratios  and contrasts  the  performance  of four  portfolios  -
Unhedged,  Naive, es-ante Risk-Minimizing  and ex-post - over the
life  of the hedges. By definition,  an ex-post  hedge  provides  the
maximum amount of information  to the hedger and, as a result,
yields the maximum amount of risk reduction.  It can, thus, be
thought  of as a  benchmark  against  which  to compare  the performance
of other hedges. 14 It is apparent  from the results  that in every
one of these  hedges  the risk  of the  unhedged  position  exceeded  the
risk of the hedged position. Notice also that if a policy of
covering  all of the spot  positions  in the futures  market  had been
followed,  the  risk  of the  Naive  portfolio  would  have  been  less  than
the Unhedged  portfolio  in twelve  of the hedges  but more than the
Unhedged  in five  of the  hedges. This  is not surprising  given  that
Naive  hedges  work  well  only  when  the spot  commodity  and the  futures
commodity  are  almost  identical.
'i1t  should  be  remembered  that  the  risk-minimizing  portfolio  is
es-ante.  The exps  risk-minimizing  portfolio  may  be  quite
different.Table  4:  Performnce  of Hedged  and  Unhiedged  Portfolios  for UJzbekistan  Cotton
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  ____  _____  _____  _____A  priL  198 7  K e da  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _
Period  - Portfolio  jHedge  Ratio  Return  jRisk  Risk  Reduction
Aug  85  -aor  87  unhedged  Ih  a 0  .50  I25.41
Naive  h  a1  .39  I1.85  92.7. EX-Ante  Hedged  I  h  a  .17  .48  I  18.38  282 Apr  8T  - Feb88s  'EX-Post  Hedged  I  j  10  .38  1  1.74I93
Aor  T  II  ITF11*
Period  Portfollo  Hedge  Ratio  Return  Risk  Risk  Reductlon
Aug  85  -Har  a  unhedged  h  0  -1.01  22.92 
Naive  h  a  1  I-.9  13.27  986 Ex-Ante  Hedged  h  *  .28  -1.06  14.62  836 |  Apr  87  - Feb  U9  Ex-Post  Hedged  h  =  1.23  1 -1.23  2.56  89X
Period  Portfolio  Hedge  Ratio  Return  Risk  Risk  Reduction  _
Au 85  -Nar  89  Urlhedged  h  a 0  63  5.09  .
Nalve  h  a  1  .35  1.17  77X Ex-Ante  Hedged  h  - .35  I  .53  1.64  168 Apr  89  - Feb90  I  Ex-Post  Hedbed  h  a  .71  _  .43  5.39  892X
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _ _  _ _  _  _  _ _  _ _  _ _  _  _ _  _ _  _ _  _ _  _  _ _  _ _  _A  p  r  i  L 9  1  I_  _  _  _  _  __I_  _  _
Period  |  Portfolio  Hedge  Ratio  Return  Rick  Risk  Reduction
Aug8  5  - Mar91  8  Unhedged  h *  0  -2.73  2.52
Naive  h  1  -. 97  2.58  -2X EX-Ante Hedged  h a  .36  -2.38  1.32  '8X Apr 91  - Feb 92  EX-Post  Hedged  h  =  .49  -1.86  1.24  91X
Notes Wie  were  unable  to construct a hedge  for  ApriL I99  due  to missing  observations. A negative  sign for risk  reductfon  means  that  the hedge  is risk-intreasing  rather  than rRlk-reducing.TabLe  5: Performne.  of  Hedged  and Unhedged  Portfolios  for  Chinese  Cotton
__________________ _  __________________  April  1987 Hedge
Period  Portfolio  Hedge  Ratio  Return  Rlrk  Rlsk-Reduetlon
May  85  eNor  87  Unhedged  h  0  .77  23.51
Naive  h a 1  .66  2.04  91X I  Ex Ante Hedged  h *  .27  .74  14.00  41X Apr  87-  Feb  88  Ex-Post Hedoed  h a 1.03  .66  j2.02  92Z
- April  1988 Hedge
|  Period  _  _  Portfolio  Hedge  Ratio  RetLrn  Risk  Risk-Reductfon
Hay 85-  Mar 88  niheedged  h  1  -.16  1.846 
Ex-Ante Hedged  h  a  .35  -. 22  5.9I  43X
UAr 88 - Feb  89  Ex-Post Hedged  Ih  .65  -. 27  14.81  I54X
April  1989  Heoge
Period  Portfolio  Hedge  Ratio  Return  Risk  Risk-Reduction  |
May  85  -Mar 89  UNived  h  - O  -. 07  5.40
i Ralve  h  a  I  .41  5.39  564
Ex-Ante Hedged  h a  .37  .11  2.38  56X
Apr 89-  Feb  90  Ex-Post Hedged  Ih .69  1.26  1.58  71X
____________  ___  ______________  April  19$C  Hedbe  ______________Hedge
Period  Portftolio  Hedge  Ratio  Return  Risk  Rik-Reduction
May  85 -Mar  90  Unhedbed  h *  0  .77  1.03
Naive  h  a  i  -1.27  3.47  -237X
Ex-Ante  Hedged  h - .38  -.01  .48  53X
Apr 90  - Feb  91  Ex-Post Hedged  h *  .31  .44  .14  571
April  199  Hedge 
Period  jg_Portfotio  Hedse  Ratio  Return  Risk  Risk-Reduction
May  85  -ar  91  Unhedged  h  *  0  -.98  4.65
Naive  h  a  1  . 2.53  45.6X
Ex-Ante  Hedged  h  a  .38  -2.07  3.36  28X
*  Ap 91  - Feb  92  Ex-Post  Heed  .02  -. 53  2.52  1 44_
Note:  A  negative  sign  for  risk-reduction  maim that  the hedge is  risk-increasing  rather  than risk-reducing.Tcble 6:  Performne  of  Heed  and Unhedged  Portfolios  for  Turkish  Cotton
|  ___________________  ___________________  __  April  1907 Hedge  _
e  dJan  65  Ploer  87  Uhedged  h  a  0  t  -.17  20.3
Nalve  h  1  1.00  25.57  2X Ex-Ante  Hedged  h 3  . .03  19.67  5X Apr 07  - Feb  88  _  Ex-Post Hedged  h  . .20  19.37  n
Aprit  198  Hedge
Period  Portfolfo  Hedge  Ratio  Raturn  Risk  isk-Reduction
Jan  65 -Mar  J  Unhedged  h.0  *  -. 76  23.96
Naive  h *  1  -.94  26.28  -10.
Ex-Ante Hedged  h  m .18  -. 80  22.39  7X Ar 88 -Feb  89  1Ex-Post  Hedged  h a  .41  *.84  121.66  10X
_____________________  _______________________  AprIl  1989  Nudge  _____________________ri_198_edo
Period  Portfolio  Hj  ge Ratio  Return  Risk  Risk-Reductlon
Jan 85  Mar 89  Unhedged  h aO0  .21  7.01
Naive  h  h  1  1.60  3.34  52X
Ex-Ante Hedged  h r  .18  .46  5.32  24X r  89  - Feb90  Ex-Post Hedged  h  5  .76  1.26_  2.94  58X
Aoril  1991  Hedse
Period  Portfolio  Hedge  Ratlo  Return  Risk  R_sk-_eductian
Jan 85  - Mar  91  Unhedged  h *  0  -1.39  20.43
maive  h *  1  .37  14.  68  2a Ex-Anta Hedged  h *  .19  -1.05  18.53  9X Aer 91  *  Feb  92  Ex-Pot  Heged  I  h *  1.05  .46  114.66  28
Note:  We  were  uablo  to  construct  a hedge for  April  1990  due to  missing  observations.  A  negative  sign  for  risk -reduction  mans that  the  hedge  Is rfsk-increasing  rather  than risk-reducing.Table 7,  Perforumne  of Hedgedw  andhltdged  Portfoltforn  for  Pakistan  Cotton.
______________________  ApriL  1991  Hed  ge  ES  _  _  i  _  ;  _  l,
Period  PortfoLio  Hedge  Ratio  Return  Risk  jRtuk-Recductimn
Aua 88  - Nar  91  Urtedged  h;C  -2.05  5.3  -0
AUuIS-NarP  Naive  h  1  -. 47  .32  194
Ex-Ante  Hedged  hi .43  -1.37  1.64  60
Av91  - Feb  92  Ex-Post Hedged  ha  .90  j-.63  .26  1952
Note:  We  were  munebe  to  contruct  hedges  far  other  years  due  to  mkissng  observatiom.
. .~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~RTaIS 8: Perfrmimnce  of HedSed  and  Umhdged  Portfolio  for  WFA  Coauc.
Ponfollo  I  Hedge  ~~~Augua  1917___  _
Vae=ance  . Risk  Raduction
portrollo~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~'  s'u
May  93 - July  87Uedged  h-a  -1.70  7  __
Nalve  h -I  -.51  23  5
Eix-Ante  Hedged  I  - 213  -1.43  48  4
Auxl  87:-JU  Ex-Pot  uHedged  j  h-  30  -.74  J2.21  705
.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~II
August  1988
jPerfod  |Portfolio  HRSaRdos  R- u  --  Ri|skane  Rbkcd
May  85 -July  I  Unhodied  h - O  ..470  6.61 
Naive  b -I  .07  3.81  425
Es-Ante  Hdgad  h - .27  -1.3  4.2  316%
Avg U-  low69  E-Post Hedged  - 1.40  15  31  S  _  ________1465
_________________________  ~~~~~~~~~August  1,969  H edge_  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _  _
PerodI  Portfolio  Heodge  Ratios  Retum  Viane  Risk  Reduedom
May 5  . July  i  Uedged  h  0  .32  4.S4  6
Naive  b-I  -.25  2.32  49% Ss-AneHedged  h  - .3  .14  1.51  60% Aug  - 9Jue  90  Ex-Post  Hedged  _  _  1  -.03  30.87  11
August  199  Hedge
Period  Portfolio  Hedge  Ratios  Returm  V lince  Rbk  Reduction
May 5  - July  S9  Unhedged  h - -.53  3.35
Naive  b - I -1.50  7.24  -116% Ex-AntHeHdgpd  h  - .32  .14  1.65  50% Aug  90  -June  91  EB-Post  Hedged  h - .36  -.80  e1.63  Sl%
Augus  1991  Heodge
Period  |Portfolio  Hedge  Ratios  Retumr  Vuaiace|  Risk  Reduction
May  U -July  SO  Unbedied  h-0  -1.11  6.06
Naive  h - I  -.2S  3.62  40% Px-Ane  Hedgpd  h  -32  -.84  4107  33
Aug  91  * June  92  EX-Post  Hedged  - .72  -.49  3.17  41S21
We can  also  calculate the risk  reduction benefits of
hedging as the percentage  of the unhedged variance that the risk-
minimizing  or Naive hedge eliminates.  Thus,
%Reduction in Risk  1 - [Var  (Hedged)  /Var  (UhHedged)]
The risk  reduction  and portfolio  returns  of the  different  portfolio
constructed  for hedging are as follows:
For Ulzbeki  cotton (Table  4), the ex-ante  portfolio  was better than
the Naive in only one of four years.  However, the year that the
Naive portfolio did worst it lead to an increase rather than a
decrease  in risk.  The risk reduction  of the ex-ante hedge ranged
from 28% to 68%, and that of the Naive portfolio from -21;  to 93;%.
The Naive portfolio risk reduction  was quite close to the maximum
possible  risk reduction  as indicated  by the ex.ps  portfolio.  In
three out of four years, the Unhedged portfolio gave a higher
return than either the ex-ante or ex-post portfolios.  Hedging
carries  a  cost in terms  of foregone  returns,  and  whether  the hedger
considers  these costs reasonable  or not depends upon attitudes to
risk  (i.e.  degree  of  risk-aversion).  .
.Additional  costs  include  the  brokerage  fee  (usually  1
thousandth  of  the  contract  value)  and  the  opportunity  cost  of
holding  a  margin  account--i.e.,  the  difference  between  the  interest
bearing notes of the margin account  and investing  somewhere else.
These.costs  are very small.21Z
For  Chi~nese cotton  (Table  5),  the  exa.nte  portfolio  was  better
than the Naive in two out of five years and in one year they had
the  same  risk reduction.  For  1990, though, the  Naive  hedge
resulted in a very  signif  icant risk increase rather than risk
reduction.  The range of risk reduction  by the ex-Rata  portfolio
was between 28& and 56% and that of the Nqaive  portfolio  between
-237%  and 91%.  With the exception  of 1991  and 1989,  the  returns  of
the tjnhedged  portfolio  were higher than the rest, indicating  that
there  is  a  cost  in  hedging  (reduced  returns  for  reduced
volatility).
For  the  Turkish cotton  (Table 6),  the  ex-ante portfolio
reduced  risk in two  out of four  cases  in the range  of 5-24%. Naive
hedges  led  to  risk  increases in  1987  and  1988  (23% and  10%
respectively)  but for 19B9 and 1991 did significantly  better than
exat  hedges.  It is worth noting  that the ex-post  hedges  led to
rather small risk reductions (7-28%-)  with the exception of 1989
(58% risk reduction)  . The return of the unhedged portfolio was
higher than the others for only one year, 1988.
For Pakistani  cotton (Table  7) simulations  were possible  only
for one year, 1991,  because of the  unavailability  of data for the
other years.  Thus, for 1.991, ex-ante hedges reduced volatility
less than the Naive while the Naive hedge gave results almost
identical to the maximum risk-reduction  possible as indicated  by
the ex-nost  hedge. The Naive  hedge  gave the highest  return  and the23
Unhedged  position  the lowest  return.
For EPT cotton (Table  8) risk reduction  benefits  range from
65t  for  the  August  1989  Naive  hedge  to -116%  for  the  Naive  hedge  of
August  1990. The  negative  sign  in 1990  implies  that  by  hedging  all
output,  the  risk  of the  naive  portfolio  increases  over  that  of the
Unhedged  portfolio. For 1989  and 1990,  ex-ante  hedges  did better
than  Naive hedges.  For the rest of the years,  Naive  hedges  did
better  than ex-ante.  However,  given the fact that Naive hedges
could  lead  to  significant risk  increases  (1990), they  are
considered  unsuitable  for  hedging  FPA  cotton  prices. The range  of
ex-ante  portfolio  risk  reduction  range  between  16%  and 60S,  which
is also similar  to the other cottons examined.  With regard to
hedging returns  for 1988  and 1989,  the Unhedged  portfolio  gave a
higher (positive)  return  than  the  ex-ante  or  Naive  portfolios.  For
the rest of the years,  the ex-ante,  Naive,  and  Unhedged  positions
all lost  money."6
To sum  up,  we  have  assumed  in this  paper  that  cotton  producing
developing  countries  are  risk-minimizers,  and  we have  been  able  to
show  that  hedging  can reduce  risk.  While  there  were some  years  in
which the  Naive hedges  led to a significant  increase,  rather  than
reduction, of  risk, overall the  Naive hedges contributed to
16For  the  case  of FPA  cotton,  Satyanarayan  et.  al. (1993)  have
extended  the analysis  to quantify  the  risk-return  trade-offs  from
hedging FPA cotton and estimated the optimal hedge ratios at
different  levels  of risk aversion.24
significant  risk reductions.  In several cases the Naive hedges
performed  at least as well as the ex-ante hedges.  However, the
possibility of  increasing risk,  rather  than  reducing  it,  as
manifested in 5 out of 19 cases, makes the use of Naive hedges
unwise  for  hedging the  cottons  we examined. At times  Naive  hedges
increase  risk significantly. It is also  worth  mentioning  that,  in
every case, higher risk reduction resulted in lower portfolio
return,  highlighting  the notion  that  hedging  carries  a  cost. 1 7 The
attitude  toward  risk  will  determine  whether  this  cost  is  reasonable
or not.
Introducing  risk aversion in the portfolio model of hedging
developed  earlier requires  some modifications. 1'  Hedges now have
to maximize an expected  utility function  that is:
EU  =  ERp - X  Var  (P)  .............................  (6)
where X  is the risk aversion parameters and ERP  and Var  (P)  are
defined in equations  3 and 4 respectively. A high (low)  value  of
X  imply  high (low)  levels  of risk aversion.  The model above is a
mean-variance  model and implicitly  assumes that the hedger  has a
quadratic  utility  function  or  that  returns  are  normally
distributed. The  optimization  problem  is to  select  the  hedge  ratio
(h)  which maximizes EU.  The optimizing  hedge ratio is inversely
related to X  and positively related to the  "bias" between the
'7Cost  is defined  as the risk-return  trade-off.
'8For  details  see Satyanarayan  et. al.,  1993.  They apply this
approach  to the FPA cotton.current  and the expected  futures  price.  For very high  values  of X
(i.e.,  high  risk aversion)  or assuming  no bias in futures  prices,
the optimal  hedge  ratio  derived  from (6)  is the same  as  in equation
5  earlier. A problem  associated  with this type  of analysis  is the
existence  of the "bias"  in futures  prices. A posteriori,  we could
calculate the "bias", but a priori, when the decision to hedge
needs  to be taken, it is hard to predict what the "bias"  will be.
Also, the "bias"  tend to change over time and that affects the
optimizing  hedge ratio-
In summary,  there is a risk-return  trade-off  in hedging.  A
risk averse  agent  will always  choose  to hedge.  However,  how much
will be hedged (i.e.,  the hedge ratio) will depend  on altitudes
towards  risk  and  the "bias"  in futures  prices.  Furthermore,  for  a
risk-averse  hedger,  the benefits  of hedging  lie not so  much in the
potential  for increased  returns  as in the reduction  of variance..II.  CONCLUSIONS
cotton exports are a significant  part of agricultural  and
total export revenues  for many developing  countries.  in several
cases the share of cotton exports has in fact increased,  which
means  that  several developing countries have  increased their
exposure  to cotton  price volatility.
In  many cotton  producing  developing  countries,  the  major  part
of the cotton  price  risk  has  been  borne  by the  parastatal  marketing
authorities  and ultimately by the government.  This was mainly
because  of the government-controlled  fixed  or minimum prices  paid
to  producers. Administrative  prices  or  price support  schemes  have
created  severe  fiscal  problems  during  periods  of persistent  cotton
price  declines. Recent  marketing  reforms  have lessened  some  of the
governments' exposure to cotton price volatility by introducing
flexibility  into their  cotton  pricing systems.
To see the  benefits  which  could  be gained  from  using  futures
contracts  to cotton  price risk, this paper investigated  the risk
reduction possibilities for  cotton from  Uzbekistan, Pakistan,
Turk  ey, China and the FPA countries,  using portfolio  analysis.  A
portfolio model of hedging was developed in which the der.ision
problem was to select  the optimal  hedge  ratio  under-  two behavioral
assumptions  - risk  minimization  or utility  maximization  under  risk
aversion.  We found  that 'cross-.hedges"l  for  the  prices  of the cotton27
varieties  examined  have  significant  risk  reduction  potential.' 9 We
simulated  ex-ante  cross-hedges  and  found  that  in  each  case,  hedging
was effective  in reducing  price risk.  In most of the cases, the
risk reduction benefits from ex-ante hedges were  around 50%,
meaning  that  the  use of  N.Y. cotton  futures  contracts  could  remove
50% of the intra-year cotton price volatility.  Naive hedges,
overall,  also reduced risk but at times led to significant  risk
increases  rather  than risk  reduction.0 Hedges  come  at a cost.  In
every  simulation  we found  that risk reduction  resulted  in a lower
return  to the portfolio. Attitudes  towards  risk,  i.e.,  degree  of
risk aversion, determine how much of the risk-return tradeoff
(i.e.,  the  hedging  costs)  is  acceptable. For  a risk-averse  hedger,
the benefits of hedging lie not  so much  in any potential for
increased  returns  as in the reduction  in variance.
19A  typical  cross-hedge  in cotton  is to hedge  the  price  of one
quality  by using  a futures  contract  based on a different  quality.
21 aive hedge is the hedge that has one as a hedge ratio.
Hedge ratio is the amount  *of  futures  contracts  needed to hedge a
certain  quantity  of a commodity (cotton  in our case).28
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